fractious diplomatic negotiations.’ However, she points out the reality is more complex: ‘Linked

introduction of a global carbon market is an ideal scenario that, however, seems unrealistic at present.

prevent the ‘carbon leakage’ of European companies outsourcing their production to countries with

trading partners to step up their carbon pricing efforts. The more developed carbon pricing systems in

incentive to push forward global debates on carbon pricing, one type of which is emissions trading.’

Green believes that, within a global system, national carbon markets should limit their links to other

markets. She says China ‘made the wise decision to remain independent, providing leeway to fix the

problems that will inevitably arise. It should postpone any other linkages being considered. Similarly,

policymakers should reject offsets from other jurisdictions.’

Governments tend to avoid difficult political decisions. As a solution, Green favours the creation of a

central carbon bank to manage allowances and prices. She points to the EU’s Market Stability

Reserve for the EU ETS, which performs similar functions: ‘governed by detailed rules, it leaves

little opportunity for member-state influence’. In theory, a central carbon bank could perform a

similarly useful, independent intermediary role. In practice, she says, the likelihood of this happening